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Plan B 
Richard Baldwin* 
The resounding French ‘non’ will have important 
consequences for French domestic politics. It may 
also change the way EU leaders proceed with 
future Treaties. But I do not believe that it will be 
the ‘political tsunami’ for the EU that many 
observers have predicted. Two reasons buttress 
this belief. 
First, the EU was headed towards rough waters 
regardless of the Constitution’s fate. Even if it 
became law by the end of this year, the botched 
Nice Treaty voting rules would be in place until 
November 2009.
1 This means that the many 
important and difficult decisions the enlarged 
EU must make in the coming years would be 
extremely difficult in any case. Of course, some 
EU leaders will construe these difficulties as 
proof that the French and Dutch voters should 
have followed their advice, but informed 
observers will know better.  
Second, I believe that there is a simple, viable 
‘Plan B’, consisting of four steps, as follows:  
Step 1. The world’s greatest political 
damage-control exercise.  
Politicians will be trying to convince about 450 
million citizens in 25 nations that the sky is not 
falling. The common theme will be “The 
French did not say ‘non’ to Europe”, but apart 
from that, national reactions will be a very 
public Rorschach blotch test.  
Step 2. The ratification process will be 
stopped.  
Continuing the process would involve almost no 
political gain and huge dollops of political pain 
– a virtual Chinese water torture for mainstream 
politicians that would give great joy and morale 
boosting to Europe’s extreme left and right. Since 
politicians get to make the decision, EU leaders 
will stop the process at their June summit. And 
they’ll have the perfect cover story. In a 
democracy, unanimity means that a ‘no’ from 
anybody is a ‘no’ for everybody.  
                                                      
        * Richard Baldwin is a Professor of International   
        Economics at the Graduate Institute of International 
    Studies, Geneva. 
1 See Annex 3 of CIG 85/04 PRESID 27.  
Step 3.  EU leaders will implement many of the 
positive elements of the Constitutional Treaty.  
The articles in the Constitution fall into three groups:  
i.  Non-changes and tidying-up: These codify existing 
practices (e.g. supremacy of EU law) or are 
renumbered articles from earlier treaties. These will 
continue to operate with or without the Constitution.  
ii.  Non-laws: Many of the best innovations in the 
Constitution are not legal changes, but rather political 
and administrative changes that do not require a 
Treaty change. These include the greater advisory 
role of national parliaments on subsidiarity, creation 
of the Council President and modifications of the 
rotating Presidency, creation of Mr Foreign Policy 
and reorganisation of EU foreign policy and the 
possibility of popular initiatives. The EU has long 
experience with making big changes outside the law 
when political consensus exists. For example, the 
Council of Europe guided European integration for 12 
years before it was even mentioned in a treaty.  
iii.  Major legal changes: The three major legal changes 
in the Constitution are: the new voting rules, the 
Social Charter, and the removal of the ‘pillar’ system 
that limits the influence of the EU Court and 
Commission to ‘first pillar issues’ (mainly Single 
Market issues). 
Step 4. EU leaders will implement only one of the three 
major novelties in the Constitutional Treaty – the voting 
rules – and they’ll do this in the Accession Treaties of 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 or 2008. 
The voting rules are essential – a point that everyone in 
Europe will appreciate after the string of decision-making 
crises that will be hallmark of the EU during the next 
couple of years under the Nice Treaty rules. The first 
decision-making deadlock will probably concern the 7-
year budget plan. Importantly, these deadlocks would 
occur with or without the Constitution since the new 
voting rules would not have taken effect until 2009 in any 
case.
 2 These deadlocks will inevitably be construed as 
evidence of the consequences of the French ‘non’ and the 
                                                      
2 Draft Council Decision relating to the implementation of 
Article I-24. For more extensive analysis of the voting rule 
changes and failures of the Nice Treaty rules, see Richard 
Baldwin and Mika Widgren, Council Voting in the 
Constitutional Treaty: Devil in the Details, CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 53, July 2004.  
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need to agree new voting rules. The hard-fought 
consensus on the Constitution’s sensible voting rules will 
probably prevail, but it will probably be presented as a 
pragmatic solution to a pressing problem rather than 
family silver snatched from a burning house.   
Every enlargement requires a treaty and these treaties 
always change voting rules. Usually the changes are 
mechanical, but by 2007 all EU members will view 
reform of EU voting rules as an imperative. This is why it 
will be natural to put voting rule changes in the 2007 
Accession Treaties. 
The other two major legal changes are ‘optional extras’ – 
extras in the sense that there is no plain-as-the-light-of-
day argument for these changes. The EU worked well for 
half a century without them. The left may say that 
enlargement makes it more necessary, but the right cites 
the same reason for them being even less appropriate. 
These elements will not be taken up since they require 
treaty changes to incorporate them into EU law. This will 
not now get done since federalists and leftists no longer 
have the leverage of the voting rules; the link among the 
three stemmed from the hocus-pocus that Giscard created 
at the Convention. Magic and idealism will be the last 
thing on the minds of EU leaders after the salutary 
decision-making crises of 2005, 2006 and/or 2007.  
Five Critical Fallacies  
The amount of nonsense that has been written in the 
mainstream press about the French and Dutch rejections is 
astounding. The banner headline of the International 
Herald Tribune, for example, was “EU in disarray.” Much 
of this nonsense probably stems from the ‘cry wolf’ 
campaigns of the ‘yes’ camps. Many serious political 
leaders solemnly declared that rejecting the Constitution 
would cause a crisis. I suspect that they knew this to be an 
exaggeration but found it one of the few ways they could 
convince voters to say ‘oui’. Here I list the 5 fallacies that 
I believe are critical to the debate.   
Fallacy #1. The Constitutional Treaty was 
necessary to adapt EU institutions to meet the 
challenges of enlargement.  
False. That was the job of the Nice Treaty. From this 
narrow perspective, the Constitutional Treaty’s only role 
was only to fix up the omissions and mistakes of the Nice 
Treaty (e.g. the composition of the Commission, voting 
rules, etc.). In my oversimplified reading of history, EU 
leaders accepted the Constitutional Treaty since it was a 
face-saving device that allowed them to correct their 
mistake without admitting an error. This political choice, 
however, backfired since it did not allow them to make 
the strongest case for the Constitution – the need to 
correct the Nice Treaty. In 2003, EU leaders told their 
citizens that the Nice Treaty was necessary for 
enlargement. This was something people could 
understand – ten new members would require rule 
changes. But once enlargement had happened, it was very 
hard to explain why further rule changes were necessary – 
especially since the new rules had not even been tried – 
unless EU leaders were willing to admit that they erred in 
Nice. This was especially difficult for Jacques Chirac. He 
chaired the Nice summit and was, in my reading of 
history, primarily responsible for the botched Nice Treaty 
voting rules. 
Ironically, it was Chirac’s double manipulation of 
European integration for purely domestic goals that got 
him into his current domestic political difficulties. The 
first manipulation was the botched voting rules in the 
Nice Treaty (the Nice Treaty flaws find their origin in the 
gymnastics that were necessary to achieve Chirac’s goal 
of maintaining Franco-German voting parity despite the 
fact that the German population is one-third larger than 
the French population); the second was scheduling of an 
unnecessary referendum to divide the French left in 
preparation for the French Presidential elections. 
Members of the French political elite hold referenda for 
political purposes – not because they really want to know 
what “le peuple” think about a 200+ page legal document. 
Well, as they say, ‘what goes around comes around’. 
Fallacy #2. The Constitution will be re-
negotiated. 
False. EU leaders never asked for a Constitution. Giscard 
d’Estaing stretched the Laeken Declaration mandate by a 
mile and created a mood where reluctant nations were 
characterised as selfish trouble-makers.
3 In the end, the 
Constitution’s ad hoc nature was necessary to line up an 
ad hoc coalition of idiosyncratic national concerns behind 
the draft Constitution. This ad hoc nature is exactly why 
no one could ever explain exactly why Europe needed the 
Constitution it had lived without for nigh-on 50 years and 
five enlargements. Giscard’s only hard constraint was to 
produce a draft that was acceptable to the leaders of the 
EU15. The EU15 agreed that his draft was “a good basis 
for starting in the Intergovernmental Conference” in June 
2003, but subsequently rejected it, modified it and only 
barely adopted it in June 2004 – after the enlargement had 
already happened.  
During any renegotiation of the Treaty, the voices of the 
ten new members would have much greater weight than 
they did at the Convention. These countries want Irish 
income growth and British job creation, not the stagnation 
and unemployment that seem to be associated with French 
and German labour market institutions. There is almost 
zero chance of the Social-Charter-without-pillars 
                                                      
3 Laeken says: “In order to pave the way for the next 
Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as 
possible, the European Council has decided to convene a 
Convention composed of the main parties involved in the 
debate on the future of the Union. In the light of the 
foregoing, it will be the task of that Convention to consider 
the key issues arising for the Union's future development and 
try to identify the various possible responses.” (Emphasis 
added). Most people would not read this as saying, “Please 
narrow down the options to a single draft Constitution”. PLAN B | 3 
emerging from a new set of negotiations, and forget about 
anything even more ambitious, like Social Europe. Given 
this reality, no one has a strong interest to push for 
renegotiation. 
Fallacy #3. The Constitution could be much 
better.  
False. The EU cannot have a Constitution that looks like a 
constitution in the traditional sense of the word – i.e. a 
succinct statement of goals and a description of the 
allocation of power among decision-making institutions. 
This would create a new level of EU law (the Treaties are 
now the highest level with Directives and the like forming 
secondary law). The problem is that this new top level of 
law would pose a threat to legal certainty throughout the 
EU legal system. One could never be sure when a judicial 
interpretation of ambiguities between the Constitution and 
other Treaties might alter existing law. As the Convention 
concluded, a real constitution “might well prove a 
permanent source of conflict.”
4 This is also why the 
Constitutional Treaty repealed all the existing Treaties. 
Nations need constitutions before they make their laws, 
not after.  
Fallacy #4. The EU would work smoothly, if the 
Constitution were ratified.  
False. A political deal in June 2004 meant that the 
Constitutional Treaty voting rules would not have come 
into effect until November 2009 in any case.
5 That means 
that regardless of what happens to the Constitution, the 
EU will have had to live with the botched Nice Treaty 
rules for the entire life of this Commission and 
Parliament. The same is true for most current EU leaders 
since few of them will still be in power in November 
2009. My bet is that even with the Constitution ratified, 
the EU would have agreed to implement the 
Constitutional voting rules with the 2007 Accession 
Treaties. They really cannot live with the Nice rules. The 
lack of crises up to this point tells us nothing since EU 
leaders and the Commission have been tip-toeing around 
difficulties in order to reduce the chances of upsetting 
referendum voters in France and elsewhere. For example, 
discussion on CAP reform was postponed for this reason, 
but once this issue arises, we shall see real fireworks 
between the rich Northern European farmers who get 
most of the CAP cash, and the poor EU farmers in Central 
Europe.  
                                                      
4 CONV 250/02, as quoted in Peter Norman’s excellent 
book, The Accidental Constitution, Eurocomment, Brussels, 
p. 64.  
5 Draft Council Decision relating to the implementation of 
Article I-24. See Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgren 
“Political Decision Making in the Enlarged EU” 2004 for 
more extensive analysis of the voting rule changes and 
failures of the Nice Treaty rules.  
Fallacy #5. The French ‘non’ was a victory for 
social Europe.  
False. Ironically, the main thing that the French ‘non’ will 
have accomplished is terminating any chance of making 
the EU more ‘social.’ The Constitutional Treaty did not, 
in so many words, implement Social Europe, but it 
slipped the thin edge of the wedge into the crack that 
might become Social Europe. The combination of 
removing the pillars and adopting the Social Charter 
introduced a great deal of uncertainty into EU law. No 
one can know how the contradictions between the Charter 
and EU members’ national laws would have been 
resolved, but it is quite possible that the federalist 
instincts of the Court and the Commission would have – 
over time – led to a significant expansion of EU control of 
the labour and welfare policies of EU members. Given the 
pro-market attitudes of the new members, however, there 
is no chance of even this limited progress towards social 
Europe emerging in coming years. 
The ‘non’ may have been a leftist victory against Chirac, 
but it was an ‘own goal’ as far as Social Europe is 
concerned.  
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About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
    Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 